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Abstract
The game in which acts of participants don’t have an adequate description
in terms of Boolean logic and classical theory of probabilities is consid-
ered. The model of the game interaction is constructed on the basis of a
non-distributive orthocomplemented lattice. Mixed strategies of the par-
ticipants are calculated by the use of probability amplitudes according to
the rules of quantum mechanics. A scheme of quantization of the payoff
function is proposed and an algorithm for the search of Nash equilibrium
is given. It is shown that differently from the classical case in the quantum
situation a discrete set of equilibria is possible.
It often occurs that mathematical structures discovered when solving some
class of problems find their natural application in totally different areas. The
mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics operating with such notions
as ”observable”, ”state”, ”probability amplitude” is not an exception to this
rule. The goal of the present paper is to show that the language of quantum
mechanics, initially applied to the description of the microworld, is adequate
for the description of some macroscopic systems and situations where Planck’s
constant plays no role. It is natural to look for applications of the formalism
of quantum mechanics in those situations when one has interactions with the
element of indeterminacy. In [1] as well as more recently [2] it was shown that the
quantum mechanical formalism can be applied to description of macroscopical
systems when the distributive property for random events is broken. In the
physics of the microworld non-distributivity has an objective status and must be
present in principle. For macroscopic systems the non-distributivity of random
events expresses some specific case of the observer’s ”ignorance”.
In the present paper a quantum mechanical formalism is applied to the anal-
ysis of a conflict interaction, the mathematical model for which is an antagonistic
game of two persons. The game is based on a generalization of examples of the
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macroscopical automata simulating the behaviour of some quantum systems
considered earlier in [3, 4]. A special feature of the game considered is that the
players acts go in contradiction with the usual logic. The consequence is break-
ing of the classical probability interpretation of the mixed strategy: the sum of
the probabilities for alternate outcomes may be larger than one. The cause of
breaking of the basic property of the probability is in the non-distributivity of
the logic. The partners relations are such that the disjunction ”or”, conjunction
”and” and the operation of negation do not form a Boolean algebra but an
orthocomplemented non-distributive lattice. However this ortholattice happens
to be just that which describes some properties of a quantum system with spin
one half. This leads to new ”quantum” rules for the calculations of the average
profit and new representation of the mixed strategy, the role of which is played
by the ”wave function” – the normalized vector in a finite dimensional Hilbert
space. Calculations of probabilities are made according to the standard rules
of quantum mechanics. Differently from the examples of quantum games con-
sidered in [5, 6, 7] where the ”quantum” nature of the game was conditioned
by the microparticles or quantum computers based on them,in our case we deal
with a macroscopic game, the quantum nature of which has nothing to do with
microparticles. This gives the hope that our example is one of many analogous
situations in biology, economics etc where the formalism of quantum mechanics
can be used.
The game ”Wise Alice” formulated in our paper is a modification of the
well known game when each of the participants names one of some previously
considered objects. In the case if the results differ, one of the players wins from
the other some agreed sum of money. The participants of our game A and B,
call them Alice and Bob have a quadratic box in which a ball is located. Bob
puts his ball in one of the corners of the box but doesn’t tell his partner which
corner.
♥ ✛
1 2
34
Figure 1: Bob’s ball moves into the place asked by Alice
Alice must guess in which corner Bob has put his ball. The rules of the game are
such that Alice can ask Bob questions supposing the two-valued answer: ”yes”
or ”no”. It is supposed that Bob is honest and always tells the truth. In the case
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of a ”yes” answer Alice is satisfied, in the opposite case she asks Bob to pay her
some compensation. However, differently from other such games [8, 9] the rules
of this game (see Figure 1) have one specific feature: Bob has the possibility to
move the ball to any of the adjacent vertices of the square after Alice asks her
question. This additional condition decisively changes the behaviour of Bob,
making him to become active under the influence of Alice’s questions. Due to
the fact that negative answers are not profitable for him he, in all possible cases,
moves his ball to the convenient adjacent vertex.
So being in vertices 2 or 4 and getting from Alice the question ”Are you
in the vertex 1?” Bob quickly puts his ball in the asked vertex and honestly
answers”yes”. However, if the Bob’s ball was initially in the vertex 3 he cannot
escape the negative answer notwithstanding to what vertex he moves his ball
and he fails. One must pay attention that in this case Alice not only gets the
profit but also obtains the exact information on the initial position of the ball:
Bob’s honest answer immediately reveals his initial position. The interaction of
our players can be described by a four on four matrix (hik) representing payoffs
of Alice in each of the 16 possible game situations where a, b, c, d > 0 are her
A\B 1 2 3 4
1 0 0 a 0
2 0 0 0 b
3 c 0 0 0
4 0 d 0 0
Table 1: The Payoff-matrix of Alice
payoffs in those situations when Bob cannot answer her questions affirmatively.
Our game is an antagonistic game,so the payoff matrix of Bob is the opposite
to that of Alice: (−hik). The main problem of game theory is to find so-called
points of equilibrium or saddle points – game situations, optimal for all players
at once. It is easy to see that the classical game with our payoff matrix does
not have such equilibrium points. Nonexistence of the saddle point follows from
the strict inequality valid for our game
max
j
min
k
hjk < min
k
max
j
hjk
So there are no stable strategies to follow for Bob and Alice in each separate
turn of the game. In spite of the absence of a rational choice at each turn
of the game, when the game is repeated many times some optimal lines of
behaviour can be found. To find them in the theory of classical games one
must, following von Neumann [10], look for the so called mixed generalization
of the game. The optimal mixed strategies for Alice and Bob are defined as such
probability distributions on the sets of pure strategies x0 = (x01, x
0
2, x
0
3, x
0
4) and
y0 = (y01 , y
0
2 , y
0
3 , y
0
4) that for all distributions of x, y the von Neumann-Nash
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inequalities are valid:
HA(x
0, y0) ≥ HA(x, y
0) , HB(x
0, y0) ≥ HB(x
0, y), (1)
where HA,HB – payoff functions of Alice and Bob are the expectation values
of their wins
HA(x, y) =
4∑
j,k=1
hjkxjyk , HB(x, y) = −
4∑
j,k=1
hjkxjyk
The combination of strategies, satisfying the von Neumann-Nash inequalities,
is called the situation of equilibrium in Nash’s sense. However in the case of our
game the logic of behaviour of the players is such that usual classical theory
does not work. To see this consider Hasse diagram (Fig. 2) where to atoms
correspond different possibilities for Bob from the point of view of Alice when
she pays attention only to his negative answers.One has the special structure of
disjunction so that for example 1 or 2 is true when 1 true or 2 true but not always
true. If one considers all outcomes equally possible, then the probability of the
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Figure 2: Lattice of Alice’s questions and Bob’s answers
always true event, i.e. disjunction of any of two events occurs to be one half!
The distributivity property is broken. So a classical probabilistic description of
the behaviour of the players in the repeated game is impossible in principle.
The solution for the situation arising is given by the ideas of quantum me-
chanics. Following A.A.Grib and R.R.Zapatrin [3] we pay attention to the fact
that the ortholattice of the logic of interaction of partners of the ”Wise Alice”
is isomorphic to the ortholattice of invariant subspaces of the Hilbert space of
the quantum system with spin 1
2
and observables of the type of Sx Sθ. As it
is well known one can represent this lattice by considering on the plane two
pairs of mutually orthogonal direct lines {a1; a3}, {a2; a4}. One of these pairs
makes diagonal the operator Sx, the other Sθ. If one takes as representations of
logical conjunction and disjunction their intersection and linear envelope and if
negation corresponds to the orthogonal complement one obtains the ortholattice
isomorphic to the logic of our players. We saw that in one ”experiment” neither
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Alice nor Bob have a stable strategy. However if the game is repeated many
times one can ask about optimal frequencies of the corresponding pure strate-
gies. Due to the non-distributivity of the logic it is impossible to define on the
sets SA and SB of pure strategies a probabilistic measure. The main problem
is calculation of an adequate procedure of averaging. Following well known con-
structions of quantum mechanics we take instead of the sets of pure strategies
of Alice and Bob SA, SB the pair of two-dimensional Hilbert spaces HA, HB.
So pure strategies are represented by one-dimensional subspaces or normalized
vectors of Hilbert space (wave functions). Use of Hilbert space permits us with-
out any difficulties to realize the non-distributive logic of our players. So the
average payoff for the given types of behaviour of the players:
Eϕ⊗ψĤA =
4∑
j,k=1
hjk〈α̂jϕ, ϕ〉 · 〈β̂kψ, ψ〉
Putting into this formula the elements of our payoff matrix and using the nota-
tions pj = 〈α̂jϕ, ϕ〉 , qk = 〈β̂kψ, ψ〉 one obtains
Eϕ⊗ψĤA = ap1q3 + cp3q1 + bp2q4 + dp4q2 (2)
The definition of the Nash equilibrium for the quantum case is not much different
from the classical case (1) and can be written as
EĤA(ϕ
0, ψ0) ≥ EĤA(ϕ, ψ
0), EĤB(ϕ
0, ψ0) ≥ EĤB(ϕ
0, ψ)
It is convenient to find the equilibrium points in the coordinate form. To do this
let us fix in the space of strategies of Alice HA eigenbasis {ξ
+
1 , ξ
−
1 } {ξ
+
2 , ξ
−
2 }
corresponding to two projectors α̂1, α̂2 and let us do the same for Bob, taking
bases {η+1 , η
−
1 } {η
+
2 , η
−
2 }. The angles between the largest eigenvectors denote
as θA and θB. Then one can write in the quantum payoff function
EĤA(ϕ, ψ) = ap1q3 + cp3q1 + bp2q4 + dp4q2
the squares of moduli of the amplitudes pj , pk as
p1 = cos
2 α, p3 = sin
2 α, p2 = cos
2(α− θA), p4 = sin
2(α − θA),
q1 = cos
2 β, q3 = sin
2 β, q2 = cos
2(β − θB), q4 = sin
2(β − θB),
where α β are the angles of vectors ϕ, ψ to the corresponding axises. For values
of angles one can take the interval [00; 1800]. In the result the problem of search
of the equilibrium points of the quantum game became the problem of finding
a minimax of the function of two angle variables
F (α, β) = a cos2 α sin2 β + c sin2 α cos2 β+
+b cos2(α− θA) sin
2(β − θB) + d sin
2(α− θA) cos
2(β − θB)
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on the square [00; 1800] × [00; 1800]. Differently from the geometrical saddle
points the conditions of the Nash equilibrium are not just putting to zero values
of the corresponding partial derivatives. So in the situation of absence of simple
analytical solutions one must look for numerical methods. To do calculations we
use an algorithm based on the construction of ”curves of reaction” or ”curves
of the best answers” of the participants of the game. The definition of curves
of reaction is based on the following consideration. If Alice knew what decision
Bob will take she could make an optimal choice. But the essence of the game
situation is that she doesn’t know it.She must take into account his different
strategies and on each possible act of the partner she must find the optimal way
to act. Her considerations look like considerations of the player,expressed by
the formula: ”if he does this, then I shall do that”. Bob thinks the same way.
So one must consider two functions,
α = RA(β) and β = RB(α)
the plots of which are called the curves of reactions of Alice and Bob. Due to
the definition of these functions
max
λ
F (λ, β) = F (RA(β), β), min
µ
F (α, µ) = F (α, RB(α))
It is easy to see that intersections of curves of reaction give points of Nash
equilibrium. Numerical experiments show that dependent on the values of the
parameters a, b, c, d of the payoff function and the angles characterizing the
type of player one has qualitatively different pictures. Intersections can be
absent, there can be one intersection and lastly there can be the case with two
equilibrium points with different values of the payoff of the game, which is absent
in the case of the classical matrix game.
1. Two equilibrium points arise in the case of the payoff matrix and an
A\B 1 2 3 4
1 0 0 3 0
2 0 0 0 3
3 5 0 0 0
4 0 1 0 0
operator representation of the ortholattice corresponding to angles θA = 10
0,
θB = 70
0. One of the equilibrium points is inside the square, the other one is
on it’s boundary (see Fig. 3). The curves of reaction in this case happen to be
discontinuous. For convenience the discontinuities are shown by thin lines. The
discontinuous character of the curve of reaction of Alice made it impossible for
one more equilibrium point to occur. One of the equilibrium takes place for
α = 145, 50,β = 149, 50 and gives the following values for the squares of moduli
of amplitudes:
for Alice p1 = 0, 679; p2 = 0, 509; p3 = 0, 321; p4 = 0, 491;
for Bob q1 = 0, 258; q2 = 0, 967; q3 = 0, 742; q4 = 0, 033.
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Figure 3: Two points of Nash equilibrium
The price of the quantum game, i.e. the equilibrium value of the profit for
Alice in this case is equal to EĤA = 2.452 . The second equilibrium point
corresponds to angles α = 1800, β = 123, 50 and the squares of the amplitude
moduli
for Alice p1 = 1.000; p2 = 0, 967; p3 = 0.000; p4 = 0.033;
for Bob q1 = 0, 695; q2 = 0.646; q3 = 0.305; q4 = 0.354.
The price of the game in the second equilibrium point is equal to EĤA = 1.926 .
2. A unique equilibrium is observed for example in the case when all
nonzero payoffs are equal and are equal to one and for equal angles θA = 45
0,
θB = 45
0. The equilibrium point is located in the upper right vertex of the
square (see Fig. 4): The curve of Bob’s reaction is shown on the Fig. 4 as
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Figure 4: The unique Nash equilibrium
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continuous while the analogous curve of Alice is discontinuous when Bob is
using the strategy corresponding to the angle β = 900. To make it more explicit
the discontinuity is shown by drawing the thin line. In reality both lines are
discontinuous. This becomes evident if one prolongs both functions on the
whole real axis taking into account the periodicity: the plots of one of them is
obtained by the shift of the other one on the halfperiod – 900. The squares of
the amplitude moduli in this case have the following values
for Alice: p1 = 1 ; p2 = 0.5 ; p3 = 0 ; p4 = 0.5 ;
for Bob: q1 = 1 ; q2 = 0.5 ; q3 = 0 ; q4 = 0.5 .
The payoff of the ”wise” Alice in this case is EĤA = 0.5 .The unique equilibrium
located inside the square takes place for the initial payoff matrix a = 3, b = 3,
c = 5, d = 1 and angles θA = 15
0, θB = 35
0 (see Fig. 5).
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Figure 5: The other example of the unique Nash equilibrium
3. Absence of equilibrium is perhaps one of the most interesting phenomena,
because as it is known for classical matrix games, equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies always exist. One can obtain absence of equilibrium by taking the same
payoff matrix for which one as well as two points of equilibrium were found. For
this it is sufficient to take the operator representation of the ortholattice with
typical angles: θA = 30
0, θB = 20
0. Absence of equilibrium in this case as it
is seen from the Fig. 6 is due to the discontinuity of the functions of reaction
which is impossible in the classical case.We met this phenomenon in the first
example when two equilibrium points were obtained. This last example shows
the importance of the realization of a nondistributive lattice. In the language of
the game theory one can understand it as follows: having the same interests the
players can form their behaviour qualitatively in different ways. So the mathe-
matician can give to the client, for example to Alice, strategic recommendations:
how she can organize the style of her behaviour to make the profit larger for
the same payoff conditions. For this, however, he must know the choice of the
representation of Bob’s logic.
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Figure 6: Absence of Nash equilibrium
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